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The Impact of Audit Quality Reviews on Audit fees of New Zealand Listed 
Companies 
  
Abstract 
This study examines the impact of audit quality reviews by the Financial Markets Authority (FMA) 
on the auditors of New Zealand listed companies and on the companies themselves. The FMA 
commenced audit quality reviews in 2013. This study examines audit fees from 2009 to 2016 and 
compares audit fees over the three years before and the four years after quality reviews began. 
We find evidence of significantly higher audit fees for smaller listed companies after the 
introduction of audit quality reviews, with minimal impact for larger companies. The results 
suggest that increased costs associated with regulation were able to be absorbed by audit firms 
in respect of their larger audit clients but not for smaller clients. This may be a reflection of the 
small and concentrated audit market for listed companies in New Zealand.  The introduction of 
mandatory audit quality reviews has had greater economic consequences for smaller listed 
companies which have had a significant increase in audit fees.   
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1. Introduction 
This study examines the impact of audit oversight by the Financial Markets Authority (FMA) in 
New Zealand on the audit fees of listed companies. In 2011, the Auditor Regulation Act was 
introduced requiring the FMA to undertake quality reviews of auditors and of entities with public 
accountability (Auditor Regulation Act, 2011, s6). The purpose of the reviews was to provide an 
independent assessment of the internal quality control systems and practice of audit firms to 
ensure compliance with auditing and assurance standards to support a reliable audit opinion 
(Auditor Regulation Act, 2011, s68).  
 
The various impacts of audit regulation have been researched extensively in the United States 
but under-researched in other jurisdictions (Simnett, et al., 2016). In New Zealand, there has been 
little academic research on the effect of FMA reviews on audit practice and audit quality. It is 
believed by participants in the audit market that, following increased regulation, audit quality has 
increased while audit fees have not, according to a survey by the FMA (2015). This perception 
has not been substantiated, and the evidence was somewhat mixed. In this study we focus on 
audit fees.  The study examines to what extent the introduction of audit quality reviews affected 
the audit fees charged by auditors of New Zealand listed companies. The study examines audit 
fees of listed companies from 2009 to 2011, which represents three years of data from before the 
quality reviews commenced, and from 2013 to 2016, which is four years of data from after quality 
reviews commenced. The results show that, contrary to the FMA survey, the introduction of audit 
quality reviews has resulted in increased audit fees but the impact has been greater for smaller 
listed companies, with audit fees increasing by an estimated 15%.  These results are inconsistent 
with overseas research where audit inspections have resulted in across-the-board increases in 
audit fees. The New Zealand results suggest that increased costs associated with regulation were 
able to be absorbed by audit firms in respect of their larger audit clients but not for smaller clients. 
This may be a reflection of the small and concentrated audit market for listed companies in New 
Zealand.   
 
This research is relevant to the international audience because it adds to the literature that 
examines the impacts of audit regulation and shows that effects can differ from country to country.  
Although internationally audit regulatory regimes have common principles and powers 
(International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR, 2018)), the structure of the audit 
industry and size of the audit market may differ among countries. The study will be of interest to 
New Zealand legislators, regulators, practitioners and academics by providing insights into the 
3 
 
impact of the Audit Regulation Act.  The results will also be of interest to directors and 
shareholders of listed companies that obtain the benefits of audit services.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the relevant academic research 
on the impact of regulated audit inspections and the background of New Zealand audit regulation. 
Section 3 outlines the research question and Section 4 explains the data collection and empirical 
model. Section 5 provides the data analysis and results. Finally, Section 6 summarises and 
concludes the study. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Audit quality and audit inspections by regulators  
There have been a range of definitions of audit quality from academics and standard setters but 
no general consensus of what audit quality is. An influential definition of audit quality originates 
from the work of DeAngelo (1981, p. 186). Audit quality is defined as ‘a market-assessed joint 
probability that a given auditor will both discover a breach in the client's accounting system, and 
report the breach’.  The definition has two components: the first depends on auditor competence 
to discover a breach, while the second relies on auditor independence and objectivity to adjust or 
report the error (Knechel et al. 2013).  
Frameworks of audit quality have been developed along with a series of indicators of audit quality, 
one of the first being the United Kingdom Financial Reporting Council (2008) and subsequently 
the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (2014). Knechel et al, (2013) explain 
audit quality in the form of a balanced scorecard of four categories:  inputs, process, outcomes 
and context. Audit quality is impacted by inputs into the audit process such as the expertise and 
knowledge of the auditors; the audit process is affected by the quality of risk assessments, the 
application of judgement and the methods of collecting and evaluating audit evidence. Outcomes 
are the results of the audit process such as the audit report and the quality of financial reporting.  
Within this category are the results of inspections from regulators which Knechel et al., (2013) 
state are perhaps the most direct outcome of audit quality. Oversight of audit quality by national 
regulators is now a feature of many countries as highlighted by the International Forum of 
Independent Regulators survey of enforcement regimes (IFIAR, 2018) of its fifty-three members. 
The inspections and enforcement powers of the regulators raises research questions about the 
impact of the inspection processes and their effectiveness in improving audit quality.   
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2.1 Research findings on the impact of audit inspections on audit quality 
A significant amount of research on the impact of audit inspections has occurred in the United 
States. There is a need for more research on the impact of audit inspections outside non-US 
setting to compare the impact of regulatory inspections on audit quality in different jurisdictions to 
gain a greater understanding of audit quality at an international level (Simnett et al, 2016). 
 
Audit inspections commenced in the United States with the establishment of the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to oversee auditors of publicly traded companies 
(Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002). Prior to this self-regulation, peer reviews were undertaken.  Audit 
firms with more than 100 issuers are inspected annually and firms with less than 100 issuers are 
inspected triennially (Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, section 104(b)). The inspections include 
examining a limited number of audits conducted by the firm and evaluating the accounting firms’ 
quality control systems (Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, section 104 (d)). The PCAOB reports 
publicly on audit deficiencies arising from the audit inspections of financial statements and internal 
controls for each accounting firm which are available on the PCAOB website, but potential defects 
on quality control systems are not published if the firm addresses the weaknesses within twelve 
months (Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, section 104 (g)). The PCAOB publishes reports discussing 
trends in audit inspections that have been conducted and releases outlooks identifying key areas 
of focus for future inspections. The PCAOB has powers to undertake investigations and 
disciplinary proceedings against audit firms and associated persons for breach of rules and 
regulations and professional standards. Sanctions can be imposed and vary from deregistration, 
fines, permanent or temporary restriction on the type of work the firm or person can do, and direct 
further professional education or training (Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, section 105 (a) and (c)). 
The number of public accounting firms both US and non-US registered with the PCAOB is 1,860 
(PCAOB, 2019).   
 
Research on PCAOB inspections has focused on the trends in the number of regulated audit 
firms, the nature and frequency of audit deficiencies identified from audit inspections, and the 
impact on audit quality when audit firms have inspection deficiencies.  
 
After the first round of PCAOB audit inspections, Hermansen, et al., (2007) analysed the results 
of 316 audit firms and found that sixty per cent had audit deficiencies. Compared to other audit 
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firms, audit firms with deficiencies were generally smaller, with fewer partners, were understaffed 
and had experienced faster growth (Hermansen, et al., 2007; Blankley, et al., 2014).  
 
Researchers analysing actions that audit firms took after the first round of inspections found that 
some of them withdrew from the market.  DeFond and Lennox (2011) found that 49% of small 
audit firms1 in the United States (607 out of 1,233 firms) exited the audit market between 2001 
and 2008.  The exiting firms were generally of lower quality with a greater number of audit 
weaknesses reported.  For those firms remaining in the audit market, Hermansen and Houston 
(2009) found that they significantly improved their audit quality as there was a large drop in audit 
deficiencies identified after the second inspection.  Blankley et al., (2014) reported that after the 
first audit inspections, audit firms with deficiencies increased their audit effort as their audit fees 
increased significantly compared with non-deficient firms. 
 
Audit firms that received reports showing inspection deficiencies were often impacted negatively.  
Audit firms with deficiency reports were more likely to be dismissed by their clients, to resign from 
audits and to deregister from the PCAOB.  When an audit firm was dismissed, it was more likely 
to be replaced by an audit firm that had no reported deficiencies (Daugherty, Dickins and Tervo, 
2011). Small audit firms with financial reporting deficiencies were more likely to be dismissed by 
their clients, with the existence of an effective audit committee increasing the likelihood of 
dismissing the auditor of firms with GAAP financial reporting deficiencies (Abbott, et al., 2013). In 
further research, Acito et al., (2017) found that audit turnover is more likely if the audit client has 
greater exposure to the financial reporting deficiency reported.  Where an auditor change 
occurred, it was more likely that the client selected an auditor that had lower exposure to the 
specific financial reporting deficiency.   
 
Lennox and Pitman (2010) examined the change in market share of PCAOB inspected firms. 
They found that the market share of audit firms with a reported weakness did not change 
significantly, in contrast to the previous review system where disclosure of auditor weaknesses 
was associated with reductions in market share. The researchers suggest that the underlying 
reason for the different result was that PCAOB inspection reports did not provide sufficient 
information to the public about deficiencies in audit quality systems.  A subsequent study by Nagy 
(2014) found that deficiencies did make a difference. They showed that audit firms with 
                                                
1 Audit firms with 100 or fewer publicly listed clients. 
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deficiencies in quality control systems lose significant market share following public disclosure by 
the PCAOB. In an international study, Aobdia and Shroff (2017) analysed changes in market 
share of non-US audit firms subject to PCAOB oversight. They found that auditor market share 
increased after the first public inspection report, concluding that PCAOB inspections provide 
spillover benefits to non-US auditors.  
 
The empirical research findings also suggest that audit inspections have improved audit quality.  
Gramling et al., (2011) found that audit firms with deficiencies were more likely to issue going 
concern opinions after receiving a deficiency report.  For US cross-listed companies, auditors 
subject to inspections provided higher quality audits as they were more likely to give a greater 
number of going concern opinions and report more material weaknesses, compared with other 
auditors (Lamoreaux, 2016). 
 
PCAOB audit inspections have improved financial reporting quality for clients of Big 4 and other 
auditors. For Big 4 audit clients, abnormal accruals in the financial statements dropped 
significantly after the first and second audit inspections (Carcello et al., 2011). Lower abnormal 
accruals were also identified for foreign companies cross-listed in the United States after first-
time inspections, (Krishnan, et al., 2017; Lamoreaux, 2016). Tanyi and Litt (2017) found that the 
financial reporting quality of clients of small to medium sized audit firms inspected annually was 
significantly higher than that of clients of audit firms inspected triennially. Gunny and Zhang (2013) 
find that clients of triennially inspected auditors with deficient reports are associated with higher 
abnormal accruals and likelihood to restate the financial statements. However, there are 
conflicting results for annually inspected auditors with deficiencies and different measures of 
financial reporting quality. PCAOB oversight has improved financial reporting credibility in capital 
markets, as the earnings response coefficients of firms with auditors’ subject to inspections, 
increased significantly compared with a control group of firms (Gipper, et al., 2017). 
 
Other research has examined stakeholders’ perceptions of the impact of audit regulation.  
Daugherty and Tervo (2010) surveyed leaders of triennially inspected firms seeking their opinions 
on the impacts of the inspections, such as the impact on audit quality, retention of clients and staff 
and the nature of the inspections process. Responses were categorised by the size of the firm. 
There was some, but not overwhelming agreement, that the inspection process had improved 
audit quality with smaller audit firms being less positive than other firms. There was general 
agreement that the inspection process had increased the engagement hours and fees billed to 
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clients. Houston and Stefaniak (2013) examined audit partner perceptions of internal quality 
reviews and PCAOB inspections. Audit partners’ generally thought that PCAOB inspections were 
focused on finding deficiencies rather than improving audit quality. They also believed that internal 
quality reviews contributed more to improving audit quality than PCAOB inspections.  In Australia, 
Houghton, et al., (2013) concluded that there was no evidence from interviews with auditors, 
auditing standard setters and regulators, that audit regulation had improved the quality of the audit 
product and confidence in the capital market. It was perceived that, regulation had increased 
costs, especially relating to audit documentation, and there was concern that increased time spent 
on documentation might compromise auditors’ focus on important risk areas.  Increased costs 
were also considered to be a barrier to entry into the Australian audit market, thus diminishing 
competition.  
 
In New Zealand, the FMA (2015) undertook a survey of organisations to evaluate the audit 
oversight process. There were 132 respondents that included registered audit firms, directors, 
managers of issuers and professional bodies. FMA quality reviews were considered to have 
improved audit quality by 52% of the respondents (56 out of 108 responses), although 35% (38 
out of 108 respondents) thought there was no change. Although audit quality was perceived to 
have improved, 64% of respondents (66 out of 103 responses) considered that the additional cost 
of auditor oversight had not increased audit fees. The other respondents indicated audit fee 
increases ranging from $1,000 to $10,000 per audit.  
 
2.2 Research findings on the impact of audit inspections on audit fees 
Research that analysed the impact of audit inspections on audit fees found evidence of higher 
fees in some circumstances. Tanyi and Litt (2017) found that audit fees charged by small to 
medium audit firms (with 100 to 200 clients) that were inspected annually were significantly higher 
compared with audit fees charged by small to medium sized audit firms (with less than 100 clients) 
that were inspected once every three years. They suggest that the frequency of inspections to 
improve audits and eliminate deficiencies increased costs and effort. Vanstraelen and Zou (2018) 
analysed the impact on audit fees of audit firms inspected triennially over three inspection periods. 
Only clients of audit firms without deficiencies significantly increased audit fees over this period. 
Audit firms with engagement and quality control deficiencies did not increase audit fees after the 
second and third inspection rounds while audit firms with quality control deficiencies decreased 
audit fees indicating reputation damage. 
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Acito, et al. (2017) analysed the inspection reports of Big 4 audit firms from 2005 and 2009 and 
estimated the relative impact the deficiency may have on the financial statements of each of the 
auditors’ clients.  Firms with greater exposure to an accounting deficiency were found to have 
higher audit fees indicating that action was taken by the Big 4 audit firms to rectify the 
shortcomings reported by the PCAOB. 
 
Research findings also show that when an audit inspection is expected audit firms are likely to 
increase audit effort (Chi, et al., 2018; Lamoreaux, 2016; Lamoreaux, et al., 2017). Chi et al. 
(2018) found that Chinese clients perceive value in being audited by a PCAOB-registered audit 
firm and were willing to pay a premium for their service as their results indicated an increase in 
audit fees and audit quality.  
 
Regulations such as those imposed by the FMA inspections exact costs on audit firms, which are 
likely to affect some companies, for example smaller companies, differently. These increased 
costs appear to have had a substantial impact on capital markets. For example, an issue that has 
been examined is whether SOX or other regulations imposed higher costs on smaller companies. 
It is believed that the increased costs may have encouraged smaller companies to “go dark” 
(delist) (e.g. Leuz et al, 2008; Bushee and Leuz 2005). It is therefore worthwhile to investigate 
this issue in the New Zealand setting, and to take account of the special features of the New 
Zealand regulations. 
 
2.3 Background to audit regulation in New Zealand 
In 2011, the New Zealand government introduced legislation to oversee the quality of audits and 
auditors, by the FMA.  The legislation authorises the FMA to prescribe minimum standards for 
licensed auditors and registered audit firms that audit entities defined under the Financial Markets 
Conduct Act (FMC audits).2   
 
The features of the regulatory regime are consistent with IFIAR core principles (IFIAR, 2016) 
including independent oversight and operation of the regulator and an audit inspections 
                                                
2 An FMC reporting entity is defined in the Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013. These entities are 
considered to have a greater level of public accountability and include issuers of debt and equity 
securities to the public, listed issuers, registered banks, licensed insurance companies, credit unions and 
building societies (Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013, s451). 
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programme incorporating a risk- based approach, with recurring inspections at firm and audit file 
level and reporting mechanisms. The FMA is required to carry out quality reviews of registered 
audit firms, once every four years.  In practice, the FMA undertakes quality reviews every three 
years, except the Big 4 firms which are reviewed every 18 months (FMA, 2017). Quality reviews 
are undertaken to ensure that the audit systems and processes comply with auditing and 
assurance standards and that reasonable care, diligence and skill is demonstrated in the audit 
work (Audit Regulation Act, 2011, s65).  
 
A quality review is specified in the legislation and is to include: 
 i.  an assessment of the design of the internal quality-control system; 
  ii.  reasonable compliance testing of procedures, and a review of a sufficient number of 
audit files to verify the effectiveness of the internal quality-control system; 
iii.  a review of the systems, policies and procedures to assess compliance with legal 
requirements and auditing and assurance standards; 
iv. the quantity and quality of resources used; and 
 v.  compliance with competence programmes. 
(Auditor Regulation Act 2011, s68(1)). 
The audit firms are required to pay the FMA for the quality review ((Auditor Regulation Act 2011, 
s67(4).   
 
A review of audit files requires evidence that legal requirements and auditing and assurance 
standards have been complied with and that each audit is carried out with reasonable care, 
diligence and skill (Auditor Regulation Act 2011, s68(3)).  To provide a reliable audit opinion, an 
audit also has to be independent, have sufficient audit evidence and have professional scepticism 
applied by the auditors (FMA 2016). 
 
The FMA can impose penalties if audits are not carried out to the specified standards.  Similar to 
the PCAOB, the FMA can cancel or suspend auditors’ licenses and audit firm registrations and 
can suspend or prohibit audits being performed (Audit Regulation Act 2011, s78(2)).  In addition, 
auditors may be subject to disciplinary procedures from the relevant professional accounting 
body. 
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Unlike the PCAOB, the FMA does not release quality review reports to the public but prepares an 
annual Audit Quality Monitoring Report which summarises findings from the reviews undertaken 
in that year.  
 
A unique feature of the audit quality reviews in New Zealand is the small number of licensed 
auditor and audit firms. In 2017 to 2018 the FMA (2018) had oversight of 138 licensed auditors 
and 19 audit firms. The number of audit firms has dropped from 40 firms at the time the regime 
was introduced. The FMA (2018) attributes the drop to audit firms being unable to meet audit 
rotation requirements and the need for two audit partners to be involved in FMC audits.  
 
2.4 The impact of regulation on audit fees of large and small clients in New Zealand 
In a comparable US study, Alali et al., (2017) investigated changes in fee data from Audit Analytics 
for the period of 2000 through 2010. They examine the Big 4 premium for large and small clients 
as well as the effects of specific events in the post-SOX period that may have impacted on the 
Big 4 premium. They find that Big 4 audit fees increased significantly from the pre-SOX period 
(2000 – 2001) to the SOX period (2002 – 2006). However, the Big 4 pricing premium decreased 
significantly from 2007 to 2010. For small clients, a Big 4 premium existed in the pre-SOX period 
and during the SOX period (2002 – 2003). This premium decreased from 2004 – 2006 but 
unexpectedly and significantly increased in 2007 due to the adoption of PCAOB AS5 (now AS 
2201).  It is speculated that this may be due to changes in the audit pricing differentials between 
the large and small companies. The Big 4 then decreased significantly the audit fees during the 
financial crisis period (2008 – 2010), likely reflecting the poor economic conditions of the financial 
crises. The authors conclude that Big 4 audit pricing of small clients depends on the nature of 
competition and pricing power of the audit firm with Big 4 firms having the choice of rejecting small 
clients if they are not adequately compensated. In terms of the impact of regulation on audit fees, 
Ghosh and Pawlewicz (2009) show that audit fee levels rose approximately 74% in the post-SOX 
period after controlling for audit and client characteristics. They also found an increase in audit 
fees of 42% for Big 4 firms compared with the smaller audit firms. 
 
There are very few New Zealand studies on audit fees and the size of the client. One of the early 
studies was performed by Firth (1985) who indicated that audit fees were being based on costs 
incurred rather than monopoly pricing despite a high level of concentration within the auditing 
profession.  Firth (1993) later investigated and found the existence of an audit fee premium after 
New Zealand firms switched to a Big 8 brand name in 1983.  Johnson, et al., (1995) further 
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determined that higher fees are charged by the Big 5 in the large listed and small unlisted 
segments of the market. In the US (Francis and Simon, 1987), Australia (Francis and Stokes, 
1986; Carson, et al., 2004) and Hong Kong (Gul, 1999), various studies found price premiums 
charged by large auditors to smaller clients. This is consistent with the results of the meta-
regression analysis performed by Hay and Knechel (2017) who show that after controlling for 
publication bias, there is still a significant Big N audit fee premium. However, of interest to this 
study, both the Australian studies and a Hong Kong study by Lee (1996) do not find price 
premiums to Big 6 auditors in the large auditee segment of the market.  
 
Carson, et al., (2014), in their Australian study, attribute the increase in audit fees over the period 
from 2000 – 2011 to increased regulation which required greater audit effort. Based on these 
results, they surmise that the New Zealand’s Auditor Regulation Act 2011 was likely to result in 
increased market concentration and increased audit fees. Previous New Zealand studies on 
regulation focused on accounting issues, such as the introduction of NZ IFRS which increased 
audit fees (Griffin et al., 2009) or on the impact of overseas governance reforms (e.g., SOX in the 
US and CLERP 9 in Australia) which did not appear to have substantially affected audit fees 
(Griffin et al., 2009).   
 
3. Research Hypotheses   
The research findings suggest that, in other settings, the regulation of audit inspections has 
increased audit fees charged by audit firms. In New Zealand, the FMA does not publicly report 
audit deficiencies by audit firm.  However, a review of the FMA Audit Quality reports indicates that 
shortcomings in audit files have been identified. Table 1 shows the ratings given by the FMA for 
listed entities from 2013 to 2016.  
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
The FMA rates audit files ‘good with limited improvement’, ‘compliant but requiring improvement’ 
and files requiring ‘significant improvement’.3  From 2013 to 2016, 16 out of 47 (34%) files required 
                                                
3 Good or good with limited improvement required: Audit procedures have been performed around key risk areas 
and satisfactory audit evidence has been obtained. Compliant but needs improvement: Sufficient and appropriate 
audit evidence has been obtained in key risk areas.  However, a number areas of the file show that the audit was not 
performed in accordance with auditing standards. Significant improvements required: The review has found 
insufficient audit evidence for at least one key risk area or the audit file showed a material misstatement which 
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significant improvement while 23 out 47 (49%) complied with standards but required 
improvement. Only 17% received the top rating of ‘good with limited improvement required’.  This 
data suggests audit firms of listed entities would have had to make improvements to audit 
procedures and carry out additional work to obtain sufficient audit evidence to meet FMA 
standards.  The issue is whether some of these costs were passed on to the audit client if 
improvements were required.  Evidence from the FMA (2015) survey, suggests that audit fees did 
not increase and any audit fee increases were modest in the range of $1,000 to $10,000.  
However, this study had limitations because it was based on the perceptions of a range of 
stakeholders and not on the fees reported. It is also contrary to the prediction made by Carson et 
al. (2014).   
 
Based on the previous research (Acito, et al., 2017, Tanyi and Litt, 2017; Vanstraelan and Zou, 
2018) it would be expected that audit fees would increase overall. However, this evidence is nearly 
all from one country, the United States. These results might not necessarily apply to New Zealand 
because of the unique features of the New Zealand setting including the highly concentrated audit 
market and the degree of oversight such as the number of audit firm inspections. In summary, it 
is unclear if the introduction of audit oversight and compliance costs involved would be passed 
on to audit clients.  The research hypothesis is therefore stated in the null form:  
 
H1:  The introduction of FMA audit quality reviews did not increase the audit fees of New 
Zealand listed companies.    
 
The previous discussion indicates that the impact on the audit fee is expected to be different for 
diverse sectors of the market, for example based upon client size (Carson et al., 2004; Alali et al., 
2017). Based on the studies of the impact of regulation or inspection processes (e.g. under SOX) 
in various countries, the FMA audit quality reviews increased the workload of auditors therefore it 
is expected that audit fees would increase. However, Knechel, et al. (2009) using Data 
Envelopment Analysis show that audits of larger clients are generally more efficient due to the 
increase in audit effort being disproportionately reflected in lower-cost staff accountants due to 
greater efficiencies for large clients. Prior research indicates that an auditor’s operating leverage 
is greatest for large clients due to manager and partner hours reducing in proportion to the 
                                                
required restatement of the financial statements.  There are a number of areas where audit work was not performed 
according to standards.  (FMA 2016, p. 19) 
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increase in all grades of labour (Dopuch, et al, 2003; Bell et. al, 1994, O‘Keefe, et al, 1994). 
Previous studies in the United States have shown that the effects of regulation are greater for 
smaller companies (Leuz et al, 2008; Bushee and Leuz, 2005). Therefore it is expected that the 
introduction of regulation for audit quality reviews would have a greater impact on smaller audit 
clients.   
The second research hypothesis is therefore. 
H2: The introduction of FMA audit quality reviews increased the audit fees of smaller New Zealand 
listed companies relative to larger companies.  
 
4. Research design 
4.1 Data 
FMA audit quality reviews commenced in 2013, with audit firms reviewed once every three years 
and the Big 4 audit firms every 18 months (FMA, 2016).  Table 2 reports the number of registered 
audit firms, the number of audit firms and Big 4 firms inspected each year from 2013 to 2016. In 
most years, about half of the firms have been inspected.  
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
On the basis of the FMA’s selection process, all registered audit firms would have been reviewed 
at least once by the end of 2016.  We analyse audit fee and financial data for years 2009 to 2011, 
three years before inspections commenced and for years 2013-2016, four years after the 
inspection commenced.  Years 2012 and 2017 are excluded from the data analysis.  The year 
2012 is excluded as this is considered to be a year of transition to audit inspections.  The year 
2017 is excluded as in this year auditor reporting changed requiring auditors to communicate key 
audit matters in the audit report (ISA (NZ) 701 Communicating Key Audit Matters in the 
Independent Auditors Report (New Zealand Auditing and Assurance Standards Board, 2015).  
These changes applied to all listed companies in 2017 and have had a significant impact on audit 
fees (Li, et al., 2018). 
 
4.2 Empirical model 
The audit fee model is used to examine the impact of audit quality reviews on audit fees.  Based 
on Hay, et al., (2006) and Hay (2013) the audit fee model is: 
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LAF =  α0 + α1 POST + α2 LogAssets + α3 LogSeg + α4 Foreign + α5InvRec + α6ROA + α7Loss + 
α8Lev + α9Current + α10Opinion + α11Busy + α12LogNasf + α13Big4 + Fixed Effects + e 
 
The dependent variable is the log of audit fees.  Post is an indicator variable of 1 if the company 
balance date is in the years 2013 to 2016, the period in which quality reviews were undertaken, 
and 0 for balance dates in years 2009-2011.  If quality reviews have resulted in an increase in 
audit fees the coefficient on POST will be positive. 
 
The LogAssets is the natural logarithm of total assets and is used to control for client size.  LogSeg 
is the natural logarithm of the number of business segments and Foreign an indicator of 1 if the 
company has exports sales, 0 otherwise. These two variables control for organisational and 
geographic complexity of a client (Hay, 2013).  InvRec is the sum of inventory and trade 
receivables and is a measure of inherent risk.  Two variables are included to control for the 
performance of a firm: the return on assets (ROA) is Earnings before Interest and Taxation (EBIT) 
scaled by total assets and Loss is an indicator variable if the company has incurred a loss in the 
current financial year, 0 otherwise.  Controls are included for leverage (Lev), non-current liabilities 
divided by total assets, and liquidity (CurrentRatio), current assets divided by current liabilities.  
Three controls for audit engagement attributes are included: Opinion is an indicator variable of 1 
if a qualified audit opinion is given, 0 otherwise, Busy is an indicator variable of 1 if the audit has 
a June balance date, 0 otherwise, LogNasf is the natural logarithm of non - audit services and 
indicator variable for a Big4 audit firm.  
 
Given that the data is from the same individual companies over the sample period we use a 
panel data fixed effects regression consistent with auditing studies by Xu et al. (2013) Hay and 
Knechel (2010) and Groff et al. (2017).  
  
4.3 Sample 
The sample was selected from companies listed on the NZX Main Board in October 2017.  The 
sample excluded property trusts, unit trusts, funds, and Australian registered companies cross-
listed on the NZX.  This resulted in a sample of 103 companies.  Data was collected for each 
company over the 2009-2016 period.  In some cases, there is not a complete set of data for the 
six-year period because of companies listing or delisting during the period.   
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Table 3 classifies the sample by industry group and audit firm for 2016.  Consumer staples 
represented the largest industry group, including 19 out of 103 (18%) companies. Industrial 
companies included 18 observations (17%) followed by 15 consumer discretionary companies 
(14%), 12 healthcare companies (12%) and 11 information technology companies (11%).  The 
financials’ sector includes investment companies Aorere Resources Ltd and Marlin Global Ltd. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
The Big 4 audit firms dominate the audit market, auditing 96 out of the 103 (93.2%) listed 
companies in 2016.  PWC has the greater market share with 41 out of 103 (39.8%) of listed 
company audits, followed by KPMG with 21 (20.4%) audits, Deloitte 18 (17.4%) audits and Ernst 
& Young 16 (15.5%) audits.  PWC is also the dominant auditor in the healthcare, consumer 
discretionary and real estate industries.  KPMG dominates the telecommunication audits while 
KPMG and Deloitte each audit three out of eight utilities audits.  
 
5.0 FINDINGS 
5.1 Descriptive statistics of variables 
Descriptive statistics for the audit fee model variables are reported in Table 4.  The mean audit 
fee is $NZ306,402 and non-audit services fee average $NZ137,229 but there is substantial 
variation as indicated by the standard deviations. 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
Total assets average $1.063 billion for the sample with 18% of the assets comprising inventory 
and receivables.  Current assets exceed current liabilities 6.34 times on average.  Non-current 
liabilities average 26% of total assets.  The average return on assets is low at 1% with 23% of 
company annual results reporting operating losses.  The listed companies have on average 2.8 
segments and 65% generate foreign sales.  Forty-six per cent of the audits had June balance 
dates and only 1% had qualified audit opinions. 
 
5.2 Audit fee descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics for audit fees are reported in Table 5. Total, mean and median audit fees 
are analysed by year and audit firm. In 2009, KPMG had 51.1% of the total audit fees followed by 
PWC (28.7%), Deloitte (10.1%), Ernst & Young (7.4%) and other auditors (2.7%). By 2016, the 
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profile changed considerably with PWC collecting 33.5% of the total audit fees followed by Ernst 
& Young (25.1%), KPMG (22.8%), Deloitte (16.1%) and other auditors (2.4%). The large decline 
in market share of KPMG was substantially caused by KPMG losing the $NZ 3,000,000 Fletcher 
Building Industries Ltd audit to Ernst & Young in 2015. The audit market for listed companies is 
dominated by the Big 4 which audited 97.6% of the listed companies in 2016.  
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
The average audit fee decreased from $NZ 335,447 in 2009 to $NZ 299,585 in 2016 a decrease 
of 10.7%.  During this period the Consumer Price Index increased 12.9% from the first quarter of 
2009 (index 876.8) and the final quarter of 2016 (index 990.2) (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 
n.d.).  In contrast, the median audit fee increased by 21.3%.  
 
The mean and median audit fees by Big 4 firms vary over time. Because of this variation, a 
constant annual compound growth rate (CAGR) in the mean and median audit fees is calculated 
over the 2009 to 2016 period. The overall mean audit fee declined by -1.6%.  For the same period 
the compound average annual rate of inflation was 1.6%.  Thus, during this period, mean audit 
fee increases do not appear to have covered inflation.  
 
The compound growth rates CAGR show considerable variation by audit firm. While PWC gained 
market share over the 2006-2016 period, the CAGR for mean and median audit fees is minimal 
at -0.4% and 0.8% respectively. KPMG and EY’s mean and median CAGRs are affected by the 
Fletcher Building Industries Ltd audit switch. While Ernst and Young’s mean CAGR increased by 
10.1%, for KPMG it declined by -10.1%. Other audit firms have shown increases in audit fees with 
CAGR mean and median audit fees of 7.4% and 5.7% respectively.  
 
The analysis is repeated for a constant sample of audits for the same company for the seven-
year period.  The sample comprises 68 firms. The CAGRs (not reported) in the overall mean and 
median audit fees are a little higher than the full sample at 0.3% (full sample -1.6%) and 3.8% (full 
sample 2.8%) respectively. The growth rates are also slightly higher for the Big 4 firms but lower 
for other firms (mean CAGR of 6.6% and median CAGR of 4.7%). 
 
In contrast, Griffin et al. (2009) investigating audit fees in New Zealand from 2002 to 2007, found 
an increase in mean audit fees of 7.3 per cent compounded annually ($NZ 142,373 in 2002 to 
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$NZ 234,402 in 2007).  In 2007, New Zealand auditors earned total audit fees of $NZ 25.3 million, 
with the Big 4 firms earning $NZ 24.5 million of that total and around 95 per cent of combined 
audit fees and non-audit fees. Collectively the Big 4 performed more than 82 per cent of the audits. 
PWC captured the highest market share (35.9%), followed by KPMG (27.5%), other auditors 
(18.3%), Deloitte (11.0%) and Ernst & Young (7.3%). The market share of all the Big 4 firms 
remained relatively stable over the period 2002 - 2007. When comparing the market share over 
time, the major change has been in the share of the other auditors which has decreased from 
21.9% in 2002 (Griffin et al., 2009) to 2.4% in 2016. 
 
Table 6 shows the movement in the number of listed company audits held by each firm from 2009 
to 2016. Movements are classified by new company listings, switches between auditors and 
delistings.   
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
The table shows that PWC increased market share through new company listings in 2015 and 
2016. These listings included AFT Pharmaceuticals Listed, Orion Health Group, Oceania 
Healthcare, NZME Ltd and Tegel Group Holdings. Other audit firms have lost market share 
through listed companies switching to a Big 4 auditor.  
 
Table 7 reports the CAGRs for small and large companies based on the median of total assets of 
the sample. The CAGRs in the mean and median are negative at -2.7% and -1.2% respectively 
for large companies.  In contrast, the CAGR in mean audit fees of small companies was 2.7% 
and the CAGR in the median audit fee 10.5%.   
 
[Insert Table 7] 
 
Overall, the audit fee analysis shows that the audit market for listed companies is concentrated 
with the Big 4 earning 97.6% of the audit fees. There has been very little growth in median and 
median audit fees of audit firms of listed companies over the 2009 to 2016 period with the CACR 
mean declining by 1.6% from 2009-2006. The analysis of audit fees by size of listed company 
shows that mean CAGR audit fees have increased for small companies and decreased for large 
companies.  
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5.3 Regression Results  
Table 8 reports the result of the panel data fixed effects regression audit fee model for the full 
sample.  The regression for the full sample explains 80.7% of the variation in audit fees.  
 
[Insert Table 8] 
 
The coefficients of LogAssets, LogSeg, and InvRec are positively and significantly related to audit 
fees; indicating that audit fees are higher for companies that are larger, more complex and have 
greater inherent risk. Foreign, ROA and CurrentRatio are negatively associated with audit fees 
but are not significant. Opinion and Busy are positive and significant. Loss and LogNASF are not 
significant in the audit fee model. The coefficient for Big 4 is negative and significant, but this 
result is not very indicative of the relationship between Big 4 and other auditors because the 
market share of the other auditors is so very small. Industry sector was excluded as a control 
variable because of the fixed effects model takes account of company and industry differences. 
 
The variable of interest is POST. The coefficient is positive and highly significant indicating that 
audit fees increased after the introduction of audit regulation. The coefficient estimates that audit 
fees increased by 9.9% after the introduction of quality reviews (computed as ex -1). This result is 
consistent with overseas studies and is consistent with increased effort of audit firms which is 
then passed on the audit clients. The null hypothesis is then rejected.  
 
The sample is then split into large and small companies using total assets. It is argued that larger 
companies have economies of scale which may reduce the impact of the introduction of regulation 
on audit fees.  For example, if the auditors have to do more work to make sure the audit files are 
in good order for a review, that could be a substantial proportion of the work for a smaller 
company, but relatively trivial for a larger company.   
 
[Insert Table 9] 
 
The results in Table 9 show that POST is positive and highly significant for smaller sized 
companies below the median. Audit fees of small companies increased by 16.1%, based on the 
coefficient estimate of .149. In contrast, POST is positive and not significant for larger companies 
with assets greater than the median. The results show that the introduction of audit regulation had 
an effect of increasing audit fees for small but not large companies.   
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6. Summary and conclusions 
The introduction of the Audit Regulation Act 2011 established the FMA as the regulatory body to 
oversee the audits of FMC reporting entities.  This study examines the impact of the FMA’s quality 
reviews on the audit fees charged by auditors subject to FMA quality reviews.  Overseas studies 
have shown that audit quality reviews of regulators have increased audit fees of clients audited 
by both small and large audit firms.  Additional evidence suggests that firms with deficiencies 
increase efforts which increases audit fees.   
 
The impact of audit quality reviews on audit fees is examined comparing audit fees in 2009 to 
2011, three years before reviews commenced, with audit fees charged from 2013 to 2016 four-
years after inspections commenced in 2013. The regression results show that audit fees 
increased after the introduction of quality reviews by an estimated 9.9%.  Further analysis shows 
that the audit fee increases were statistically significant for smaller and not larger companies.  For 
smaller companies audit fees increased by an estimated 15% after the introduction of quality 
reviews. This economic consequences of regulatory oversight on audit firms has therefore had a 
greater impact on smaller companies.  
 
The study is subject to the following limitations.  The first limitation is that there is not a constant 
set of data for all listed companies over the periods examined because of listings and delistings 
during the period.  A second limitation is that audit fees of clients may be impacted to a greater 
extent when an audit firm receives a “significant improvement” required on an audit file reviewed 
by the FMA.  However, the FMA does not publicly report the result of its reviews by audit firm. 
 
This study contributes to the international literature of the impact on audit regulation. It also is one 
of the few studies that have examined the economic consequences of regulatory audit quality 
reviews in New Zealand. Further research could look at the impact of audit regulation on other 
audit quality indicators such as the quality of financial reporting.    
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 Appendix 1 Variable Definitions 
LAF Natural logarithm of audit fees 
Post An indicator variable of 1 for balance dates 2013 to 2017, 0 otherwise 
LogAssets Natural logarithm of total assets 
LogSeg Natural Logarithm of the number of business segments 
Foreign An indicator variable of 1 if the company exports overseas , 0 otherwise 
InvRec The sum of inventories and trade receivables scaled by total assets 
ROA Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) scaled by total assets 
Loss An indicator variable of 1 if the company incurred a loss in the current 
financial year, 0 otherwise 
Lev Non-current liabilities divided by total assets 
CurrentRatio Current assets divided by current liabilities 
Opinion An indicator variable of 1 if the audit has given a qualified audit opinion, 
0 otherwise 
Busy An indicator variable of 1 if the company has a June balance date, 0 
otherwise 
LogNasf Natural logarithm of non-audit service fees 
Big4  An indicator variable of 1 if the audit is by a Big 4 audit firm, 0 otherwise 
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Table 1 FMA ratings of audit files of listed entities 2013 to 2016 
 Year Good with 
limited 
improvement 
required 
Comply but 
require 
improvement 
Significant 
improvement 
required 
Total 
n % n % n % n % 
2013 2 29% 2 29% 3 42% 7 100% 
2014 1 7% 9 64% 4 29% 14 100% 
2015 5 39% 6 46% 2 15% 13 100% 
2016 0 0 6 46% 7 54% 13 100% 
Total 8 17% 23 49% 16 34% 47 100% 
Source: FMA audit quality reports (FMA 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016) 
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Table 2 Number of audit inspections 2013 to 2016 
Year No. 
registered
audit firms 
No. 
inspected 
No. Big 4  
inspected 
 
2013 40 9 1 
2014 30 17 2 
2015 29 12 2 
2016 24 12 2 
Source: FMA audit quality reports (FMA 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 
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Table 3 Sample by industry and audit firm 2016  
 n (%) PWC KPMG Deloitte Ernst & 
 Young  
Other 
Consumer discretionary 15 (14) 8 4 1 1 1 
Consumer staples 19 (18) 7 4 3 3 2 
Energy 3 (3) 1 2 0 0 0 
Financials 2 (2) 1 0 0 0 1 
Health care 12 (12) 7 0 3 2 0 
Industrial 18 (17) 7 1 5 4 1 
Information technology 11 (11) 4 3 1 2 1 
Materials 4 (4) 1 0 1 1 1 
Real estate 8 (8) 4 1 1 2 0 
Telecommunications 3 (3) 0 3 0 0 0 
Utilities 8 (8) 1 3 3 1 0 
Total 103 (100%)  41 21 18 16 7 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for variables n= 673 
 Mean Median Standard Dev Minimum Maximum 
Audit fee $306,402 $154,000 $496,703 $10,000 $4,000,000 
Non- audit 
services fee 
$137,229 $32,000 $307,467 0 $3,070,000 
Total Assets $1,063,787,304 $228,004,000 $1,808,977,936 $233,000 $8,715,599,000 
InvRec 18% 10% 19% 0% 98% 
CurrentRatio 6.34 1.49 33.9 0.00 457.64 
Lev 26% 22% 36% 0% 495% 
ROA 1% 7% 29% -275% 135% 
Loss 23% 0% 42% 0% 100% 
Segments 2.81 3.00 1.58 1.00 7.00 
Foreign 0.65 1.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Opinion 1% 0% 11% 0% 100% 
Busy 46% 0% 50% 0% 100% 
InvRec is the sum of inventory and trade receivables scaled by total assets. CurrentRatio is current assets divided by 
current liabilities Lev is non-current liabilities divided by total assets ROA is Earnings before Interest and Taxation 
(EBIT) scaled by total assets. Loss is an indicator variable if the company has incurred a loss in the current financial 
year, 0 otherwise. Segments is the number of business segments.  Foreign an indicator of 1 if the company has exports 
sales, 0 otherwise. Opinion is an indicator variable of 1 if a qualified audit opinion is given, 0 otherwise. Busy is an 
indicator variable of 1 if the audit has a June balance date, 0 otherwise,  
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Table 5 Total, mean and median audit fees by year and audit firm  
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 CAGR  
Overall           
Total  23,481,288 21,958,711 23,263,677 25,287,588 27,105,334 26,106,495 28,148,218  30,857,215  
Mean 335,447 296,739 310,182 324,200 322,683 290,072 284,325 299,585 -1.6% 
Median 152,500 145,000 157,000 163,500 145,500 140,500 164,000 185,000 2.8% 
Std dev 643,986 296,739 310,182 324,200 322,683 290,072 284,325 299,585  
% chg median   -4.9% 8.3% 4.1% -11% -3.4% 16.7% 12.8%  
N 70 74 75 78 84 90 99 103  
PWC           
Total  6,733,650 5,915,000 5,832,500 5,907,550 6,443,162  6,964,725  8,501,650 10,349,00  
% Total 28.7% 26.9% 25.0% 23.4% 23.8% 26.7% 30.2% 33.5%  
Mean 258,987 211,250 216,019 210,984 214,772 224,669 223,728 252,415 -0.4% 
Median 198,500  174,000 197,000 155,500 143,500 140,000 185,000 210,000 0.8% 
Std dev 199,829 159,351 164,983 181,037 186,923 203,911 182,355 214,942  
% chg median   -12.3% 13.2% -16.2% -12.1% -2.4% 30.7% 13.5%  
N 26 28 27 28 30 31 38 41  
KPMG           
Total  12,009,464 10,783,180 11,198,467 12,030,070 12,224,520 10,302,760 6,858,583 7,036,205  
% Total 51.1% 49.1% 48.1% 47.6% 45.1% 39.5% 24.4% 22.8%  
Mean 706,439 634,305 658,733 668,337 643,396 490,608 342,929 335,057 -10.1% 
Median 172,000 152,000 165,000 185,000 214,000 197,000 202,500 233,000 4.4% 
Std dev 1,194,626 992,713 967,952 961,055 1,023,132 696,330 331,437 371,671  
% chg median   -11.6% 8.6% 12.1% 15.7% -7.9% 2.8% 15.1%  
N 17 17 17 18 19 21 20 21  
Deloitte           
Total  2,374,500 2,911,652 3,000,472 3,666,000 3,751,000 4361,000 4,613000 4,,981,857  
% Total 10.1% 13.3% 12.9% 14.5% 13.8% 16.7% 16.4% 16.1%  
Mean 237,450 264,696 272,770 305,500 267,929 272,563 256,278 276,770 2.2% 
Median 152,000 192,000 210,000 163,000 130,500 125,000 115,500 143,000 -0.9% 
Std dev 294,278 289,975 289,396 296,573 288,659 299,702 294,512 298,403  
% chg median   26.3% 9.4% -22.4% -19.9% -4.2% -7.6% 23.8%  
N 10 11 11 12 14 16 18 18  
Ernst & Young          
Total 1,726,500 1,527,055 2,394,710 3,034,485 4,020,100 3,744,330 7,395,915 7,755,960  
% Total 7.4% 7.0% 10.3% 12.0% 14.8% 14.3% 26.3% 25.1%  
Mean 246,643 218,151 266,079 275,862 335,008 288,025 493,061 484,748 10.1% 
Median 105,000 96,830 168,000 165,000 154,775 180,000 184,000 189,000 8.8% 
Std dev 296,139 254,303 327,228 378,678 424,453 356,863 823,827 817,612  
% chg median   -7.8% 73.5% -1.8% -6.2% 16.3% 2.2% 2.7%  
N 7 7 9 11 12 13 15 16  
Other           
Total 637,174 821,824 837,528 649,483 666,552 733,680 779,070 734,193  
% Total 2.7% 3.7% 3.6% 2.6% 2.5% 2.8% 2.8% 2.4%  
Mean 63,717 74,711 76,138 78,448 80,855 82,768 97,383 104,884 7.4% 
Median 30,500 36,000 41,000 39,150 43,500 47,000 46,000 45,000 5.7% 
Std dev 103,394 89.893 92,951 98,035 103,540 101,951 130,890 144.177  
% chg median   18.0% 13.9% -4.5% 11.1% 8.0% -2.1% -2.2%  
N 10 11 11 9 9 9 8 7  
1Constant annual compound growth rate 
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Table 6 Movement in number of listed company audits by Big 4 audit firms  
 N PWC KPMG Deloitte 
Ernst & 
Young Other 
2009 70 26 17 10 7 10 
New listings 4 2 0 1 0 1 
2010 74 28 17 11 7 11 
New listings 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Switches (net) 0 -1 0 0 1 0 
2011 75 27 17 11 9 11 
New listings 4 1 1 0 2 0 
Switches (net) 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Other1   -1 0 0 0 0 -1 
2012  78 28 18 12 11 9 
New listings 5 2 0 1 1 1 
Switches (net) 0 0 1 0  0 -1 
Other  1 0 0 1 0 0 
2013 84 30 19 14 12 9 
New listings 6 1 2 1 1 0 
Switches (net) 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2014 90 31 21 16 13 9 
New listings 9 5 1 2 1 0 
Switches (net) 0 2 -2   1 -1 
2015 99 38 20 18 15 8 
New listings 5 4 0 0 1 0 
Delisting -1 0 0 0 -1 0 
Switches (net) 0 -1 1 0 1 -1 
2016 103 41 21 18 16 7 
1 Listed company not audited 2011. In subsequent year audited by Deloitte.
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Table 7 Mean and Median Audit Fees by Large and Smaller Companies   2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 CAGR 
Large  
Mean 574,727 497,051 512,208 530,828 536,002 469,588 467,080 474,183 -2.7% 
Median 295,000 259,000 239,000 289,000 301,000 279,500 269,000 272,000 -1.2% 
% change median   -12.2% -7.7% 20.9% 4.2% -7.1% -3.8% 1.1%  
N 33 36 37 39 41 44 45 48  
Small 
Mean 122,035 106,971 113,473 117,572 119,285 118,361 132,030 147,208 2.7% 
Median 57,000 71,000 74,138 76,000 90,000 78,500 102,500 115,000 10.5% 
% change median  24.6% 4.4% 2.5% 18.4% -12.8% 30.6% 12.2%  
N 37 38 38 39 43 46 54 55  
A large company has total assets greater than the median total assets of the sample, otherwise a small company.   
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Table 8 Audit Fee Model  
 Full sample  
Variable Coefficient Std Error Prob 
POST (2013-2016) 0.095 0.026 0.000 
LogAssets 0.286 0.027 0.000 
LogSeg 0.280 0.057 0.000 
Foreign -0.129 0.141 0.360 
InvRec 0.546 0.156 0.001 
ROA -0.030 0.055 0.595 
Loss 0.004 0.042 0.915 
Lev 0.042 0.039 0.278 
CurrentRatio -0.000 0.000 0.974 
Opinion 0.252 0.105 0.016 
Busy 0.722 0.319 0.024 
LogNasf 0.001 0.003 0.741 
Big4 -0.213 0.072 0.003 
Constant 5.683 0.530 0.000 
Observations 673 
R2 80.7% 
F-statistic 26.01 
P value of F-statistic 0.000 
 
POST (2013-2016) An indicator variable of 1 for balance dates 2013 to 2017, 0 otherwise. LogAssets is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. LogSeg is the natural logarithm of the number of business segments. Foreign an indicator of 
1 if the company has exports sales, 0 otherwise. InvRec is the sum of inventory and trade receivables scaled by total 
assets. ROA is Earnings before Interest and Taxation (EBIT) scaled by total assets. Loss is an indicator variable if the 
company has incurred a loss in the current financial year, 0 otherwise. Lev is non-current liabilities divided by total 
assets. CurrentRatio is current assets divided by current liabilities. Opinion is an indicator variable of 1 if a qualified 
audit opinion is given, 0 otherwise. Busy is an indicator variable of 1 if the audit has a June balance date, 0 otherwise, 
LogNasf is the natural logarithm of non-audit services. Big4 is indicator variable of 1 if the audit is by a Big4 audit firm, 
0 otherwise.  
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Table 9 Audit fee model  for large and small companies  
 Small companies Large companies 
Variable Coeff Prob Coeff Prob 
POST (2013-2016) 0.149 0.000 0.029 0.261 
LogAssets 0.197 0.000 0.409 0.000 
LogSeg 0.329 0.000 0.247 0.013 
Foreign ‐0.091 0.748 ‐0.187 0.198 
InvRec 0.685 0.002 0.732 0.010 
ROA 0.046 0.510 ‐0.275 0.340 
Loss 0.020 0.749 ‐0.054 0.397 
Lev 0.030 0.608 0.018 0.753 
CurrentRatio 0.000 0.974 ‐0.030 0.040 
Opinion* 0.421 0.001 ‐0.869 0.002 
Busy 0.561 0.221 NA  
LogNasf 0.004 0.438 ‐0.001 0.728 
Big 4 0.122 0.331 0.126 0.277 
Constant 7.082 0.000 3.849 0.001 
Observations 336  337  
R2 76.7%  52.6%  
P value of F-statistic 0.000  0.000  
 
NA: omitted because of insufficient observations in the period.  
 
Small and large companies are those smaller or larger than the median asset value. 
 
POST (2013-2016) An indicator variable of 1 for balance dates 2013 to 2017, 0 otherwise LogAssets is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. LogSeg is the natural logarithm of the number of business segments. Foreign an indicator of 1 if the company has exports 
sales, 0 otherwise. InvRec is the sum of inventory and trade receivables scaled by total assets. ROA is Earnings before Interest and 
Taxation (EBIT) scaled by total assets. Loss is an indicator variable if the company has incurred a loss in the current financial year, 0 
otherwise. Lev is non-current liabilities divided by total assets. CurrentRatio is current assets divided by current liabilities. Opinion is an 
indicator variable of 1 if a qualified audit opinion is given, 0 otherwise. Busy is an indicator variable of 1 if the audit has a June balance 
date, 0 otherwise, LogNasf is the natural logarithm of non-audit services. Big4 is indicator variable of 1 if the audit is by a Big4 audit 
firm, 0 otherwise.  
